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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO.  04-4651
FREDERICK T. RAY, III,
               Appellant
   v.
CELL EXTRACTION UNIT 7; WALKER, CAPT;  JOHN DOE #1;
JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3; JOHN DOE #4; JOHN DOE #5;
JOHN DOE #6; JOHN DOE #7; JOHN MASTERS, WARDEN; AUCH,
SERGEANT; THOMAS, SERGEANT; YAMAGUCHI, CSI; PETTIFORD, CSI;
CPO HAWKINS; COI FORD; CORPORAL BOYD
_________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Civ. No. 03-cv-873)
District Judge: Honorable John P. Fullam
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) or Possible Summary
Action under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 14, 2005
BEFORE: ROTH, BARRY and SMITH, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: September 14, 2005)
_______________________
 OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Frederick Ray filed this civil rights action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
As the parties are familiar with the facts, we recite them here only as necessary to1
our discussion.  We note that the District Court consolidated this case with two other
cases brought by Ray, Ray v. Walker, Civ. No. 03-3093, and Ray v. Brooks, Civ. No. 03-
1050. 
2
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging due
process violations.   Ray alleges that Appellees, correctional officers and prison officials1
at Chester County Prison, violated his constitutional rights when they forcibly transferred
him to a punitive isolation cell and failed to provide him with a disciplinary hearing.  Ray
further alleges that the conditions of confinement in punitive isolation violated his rights
as a pretrial detainee.  Ray seeks both damages and injunctive relief. 
Throughout the discovery period, the parties filed various motions to compel
discovery, for a protective order, and for permission to take depositions, which the
District Court resolved in an order entered September 13, 2004.  Appellees then moved
for summary judgment, attaching prison records and Ray’s deposition in support of their
argument that there were no issues of material fact because the allegations in Ray’s
complaint were unsupported by any evidence.  Ray filed a motion for a thirty day
enlargement of time in which to respond, which the District Court granted, thereby
extending the response deadline to November 8, 2004.  Ray did not file a response to the
summary judgment motion.  In an order entered November 30, 2004, the District Court
granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, after concluding that there was no
evidence in the record that Appellees had failed to follow proper procedures in removing
3Ray from his cell and transporting him to an isolation cell.  The District Court also held
that there was no evidence to support Ray’s conditions of confinement claim.  On the
same day that the District Court issued its summary judgment order, Ray filed a motion
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) for a continuance in order to conduct
further discovery.  The District Court denied this motion as moot on December 7, 2004. 
Ray appeals from the District Court’s order granting summary judgment. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo, viewing the underlying facts and all reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.  Pennsylvania
Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 235 (3d Cir. 1995).  Summary judgment is
appropriately granted where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  A party
opposing a summary judgment motion cannot rest upon the “mere allegations or denials
of the adverse party’s pleading” but must respond with affidavits or depositions setting
forth “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
As the District Court noted, Appellees supported their summary judgment motion with
prison records and Ray’s deposition.  Ray was allowed discovery, yet filed no response to
the summary judgment motion.  On the record before the District Court, Appellees were
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  We find no abuse of discretion in the District
We do not review the order denying the Rule 56(f) motion, as it was not appealed.2
See Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Greentree Transp. Trucking Co., 293 F.3d 120,
125-26 (3d Cir. 2002).
It does not appear from the record that the District Judge had Ray’s Rule 56(f)3
motion before him when he was deciding the Defendants’ summary judgment motion.
4
Court’s denial of Ray’s discovery motion.  See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 685
F.2d 810, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1982).
We recognize that Ray filed a motion for a continuance under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(f), asserting a need for further discovery.  Ray’s motion was received
by the Clerk of the District Court on November 29, 2004, the same day that the District
Court issued its summary judgment order and twenty-one days after the thirty day
extension of time had expired.   While there is no fixed time limit for filing a Rule 56(f)2
motion, under these circumstances, Ray’s motion was not filed within a reasonable time,
and the District Court had no reason to defer acting on Appellees’ motion.   See3
Resolution Trust Corp. v. North Bridge Assocs., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1204 (1  Cir. 1994);st
see also Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 520 (9  Cir. 1990). th
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court granting
summary judgment to Appellees.
